Having been involved in the technology development of\nSubsea Compression and developing concepts for Oil and Gas majors, I know that one\nof the most significant challenges is getting acceptance of the technology in\nthe earliest phases of the project. <\/p>\n\n\n
Pre 2016 – before either Gullfaks or \u00c5sgard had\nstarted up – it was understandable for the majors to assume a cautious position\nregarding subsea compression. Fast-forward four years and, although Equinor\n(Statoil) is still leading the way, both Chevron and Shell have selected\ncompression on the seabed as their preferred concepts. Amazing progress. So, how\ndid this change?<\/p>\n\n\n
The short answer is that it took a number of years and\na great deal of effort from a great many people, across multiple vendors and\noperating partners, all working together for a common purpose: to make subsea\ncompression a viable, phase 2 selectable concept.<\/p>\n\n\n
\nThe long answer is more complex. For a major operating company \u2013\nparticularly where gas is being fed to highly critical downstream operating facilities\n– to position itself as the next subsea compression project could appear like a\nbrave, even risky approach. However, this is not the case. To get to this point\ninvolved many technology alliances, Joint Industry Projects (JIPs), budgets,\nmarket conditions, media reports, partners, project management requirements,\npolitics, demonstrated operating history (very important)\u2026 But, at the absolute\ncrux of it all, was people. The people pushing the subsea compression option\nwere important; but people at the decision-making level were essential. Without\nthe decision makers allowing subsea compression to go through the concept\nselection process, the outcome would have been completely different. <\/p>\n\n\n
So, did the decision makers suddenly throw all caution\nto the wind and embrace risk, or was this a result of the years of work and\neffective stakeholder engagement addressing concerns and risks, and demonstrating\nthe value proposition? What it demonstrates is that there were enough people\ninvolved at the decision-making level who recognised the work that had been\ncarried out, who took into account both the historical context and the current\noperating performance in considering the concept. Having been closely involved\nin this major\u2019s project management system for more than a decade, I can confidently\nsay the only way subsea compression could have been selected is if it showed\nbetter value than the alternatives. <\/p>\n\n\n
Technology risk is a component of the project\nmanagement process, with risk and uncertainty accounted for in assurance\nprocesses. Value proposition is represented across the whole system and not\njust in key components. Subsea compression was subject to a more rigorous\ninterrogation, but this also became a great strength as system risks across\ntechnology development, construction and installation, through to commissioning\nand start-up were highlighted early and either remedied or a mitigation plan\ndeveloped. This level of detail and rigor is a necessity for subsea\ndevelopments, and although generally more applicable in Phase 3 and Phase 4, the\nexperience demonstrated the benefit in earlier Phases also. In summary, to have\nselected this concept means that subsea compression fully met all the criteria\nand selection requirements as established by one of the most stringent players\nin the industry.<\/p>\n\n\n
Why the resistance?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n It is interesting to note that the core technology in subsea\ncompression is not new. Using the centrifugal compression option as an example,\nalthough there was still some technology development required, the core\ncomponents were unchanged. The HOFIM compressor (developed by MAN DT) has been in\nuse since 2000 in an offshore environment. They have also been used to provide\nboosting in remote, unmanned locations for gas transportation along pipelines.\nIt was first installed in a marine environment for the \u00c5sgard subsea compression\nproject where the technology development was focused on (what is termed) the \u2018marinisation\u2019\nof the compressor and enabling equipment. When looking to develop a concept for\nlater fields, as the core components were already proven, technology\ndevelopment was focused on what the differences were (Change Point Analysis)\nand Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) compared with \u00c5sgard.\n<\/p>\n\n\n Technology development for the concepts was well\ndocumented and updated regularly, however, one of the biggest challenges\nthrough the years was the term \u2018technology\u2019. The challenge was in getting the\ndecision makers (and even those further down the chain) to move beyond the term\nas it became a stumbling block in itself. Negative connotations of \u2018technology\u2019\n(new, unproven, expensive) apparently began to throw up obstacles before ever\nreaching the point in the presentation. Decision-makers in the early days would\nrecoil in shock and horror when the term appeared on slides and reports, and I\u2019ve\npersonally seen meetings called to a close with simple statements such as \u201cwe\nwill never install subsea compression there\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n Progress in acceptance of subsea compression is only\npossible when concerns and risks are addressed. As above, where no meaningful,\ninformed or substantiated reason was offered against it, the problem for advocates\nof subsea compression became the need to find arguments which would address all\npotential concerns. A lot of time was spent figuring out what these concerns\ncould be, which led to some very creative discussions! Even at this time, there\nwas a steadily growing mass of data and case studies which supported a\nselectable concept \u2013 albeit without the live operational data which decision-makers\nsought. Advocates considered this absence wasn\u2019t a significant enough reason to\ndiscount the option, given the fundamental technology had already been proven\nin other applications, and operational data would be available by the time\nconcept selection was due in the roadmap.<\/p>\n\n\n Fortunately, there were enough forward-thinkers to recognise\nthe potential, and plans were initiated to develop programs to further\ncapability or enable subsea compression. The programs engaged vendors and strategic\npartners, and generated JIPs to push technology along in the subsea space, but\nimportantly provided access to the technology to inform the joint venture\nparticipants. A key fundamental requirement, though, was funding, the bulk of\nwhich was available at the Business Unit level, which was also the level at\nwhich most of the barriers presented. This was, therefore, a key focus: getting\nthe decision makers to support the technology development would help to inform\nand gain acceptance for the technology. At least that was the plan.<\/p>\n\n\n However, there was still a barrier to utilising the\ntechnologies being developed in these programs \u2013 once again, it appeared the\nproblem was fundamentally the word \u2018technology\u2019. The term was routinely rolled\nout as the reason subsea compression would not be installed in an actual\noperating environment. Although the decision makers were supporting the\ntechnology development programs, the support for installation in an operating\nenvironment was not there. This was an example of self-preservation rather than\npotentially doing what was best for the company (think high value). Decision\nmakers were happy to support technology, provided it was only ever installed\nafter they had moved on and it wasn\u2019t their decision; \u2018technology\u2019 was still\nperceived as high risk, regardless of how much data was accumulating.<\/p>\n\n\n A positive outcome.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n But it only came after subsea compression had been\ninstalled and operating for over a year. Confidence in the technology was growing\nand the unsubstantiated statement that \u201cwe will never install subsea\ncompression there\u201d became increasingly difficult to stand by. With virtually\n100% availability of the subsea compression station on \u00c5sgard, this exceeded the\nbest an equivalent topsides compression platform could achieve. <\/p>\n\n\n \u00c5sgard subsea compression has been operating at\nvirtually 100% availability since start-up (almost three years now), with the compressors\n100% available. Critically, the issues impacting the availability (pump and\nlevel transmitter) are understood and subject to Root Cause Analysis; future\nprojects have taken these lessons learned into consideration in design.<\/p>\n\n\n Also of note is that Gullfaks has been operating at\n100% availability and has exceeded 10,000 hours, qualifying the multiphase\ncompressor at TRL 7. This has been operating in a mode outside the Gullfaks\ndesign brief, albeit within the capability of the machine (higher liquid\nloadings). <\/p>\n\n\n It all seems easy now, with hindsight. Subsea\ncompression is fully qualified and selectable for projects, but if circumstances\nhad not aligned at the right time, the technology work streams would have been\nclosed down and the concept never would have been fully developed. Where we are\ntoday is testament to those who accepted the arguments with an open mind, who\nlooked to a future full of opportunity and who filed the view that \u201cit will\nnever happen\u201d away and followed due process and diligence to reach a wholly\nobjective and inevitable conclusion \u2013 that the future is subsea.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Having been involved in the technology development of Subsea Compression and developing concepts for Oil and Gas majors, I know that one of the most significant challenges is getting acceptance of the technology in the earliest phases of the project. Pre 2016 – before either Gullfaks or \u00c5sgard had started up – it was understandable … <\/p>\n