Having been involved in the technology development of Subsea Compression and developing concepts for Oil and Gas majors, I know that one of the most significant challenges is getting acceptance of the technology in the earliest phases of the project.
Pre 2016 – before either Gullfaks or Åsgard had started up – it was understandable for the majors to assume a cautious position regarding subsea compression. Fast-forward four years and, although Equinor (Statoil) is still leading the way, both Chevron and Shell have selected compression on the seabed as their preferred concepts. Amazing progress. So, how did this change?
The short answer is that it took a number of years and a great deal of effort from a great many people, across multiple vendors and operating partners, all working together for a common purpose: to make subsea compression a viable, phase 2 selectable concept.
The long answer is more complex. For a major operating company – particularly where gas is being fed to highly critical downstream operating facilities – to position itself as the next subsea compression project could appear like a brave, even risky approach. However, this is not the case. To get to this point involved many technology alliances, Joint Industry Projects (JIPs), budgets, market conditions, media reports, partners, project management requirements, politics, demonstrated operating history (very important)… But, at the absolute crux of it all, was people. The people pushing the subsea compression option were important; but people at the decision-making level were essential. Without the decision makers allowing subsea compression to go through the concept selection process, the outcome would have been completely different.
So, did the decision makers suddenly throw all caution to the wind and embrace risk, or was this a result of the years of work and effective stakeholder engagement addressing concerns and risks, and demonstrating the value proposition? What it demonstrates is that there were enough people involved at the decision-making level who recognised the work that had been carried out, who took into account both the historical context and the current operating performance in considering the concept. Having been closely involved in this major’s project management system for more than a decade, I can confidently say the only way subsea compression could have been selected is if it showed better value than the alternatives.
Technology risk is a component of the project management process, with risk and uncertainty accounted for in assurance processes. Value proposition is represented across the whole system and not just in key components. Subsea compression was subject to a more rigorous interrogation, but this also became a great strength as system risks across technology development, construction and installation, through to commissioning and start-up were highlighted early and either remedied or a mitigation plan developed. This level of detail and rigor is a necessity for subsea developments, and although generally more applicable in Phase 3 and Phase 4, the experience demonstrated the benefit in earlier Phases also. In summary, to have selected this concept means that subsea compression fully met all the criteria and selection requirements as established by one of the most stringent players in the industry.
Why the resistance?
It is interesting to note that the core technology in subsea compression is not new. Using the centrifugal compression option as an example, although there was still some technology development required, the core components were unchanged. The HOFIM compressor (developed by MAN DT) has been in use since 2000 in an offshore environment. They have also been used to provide boosting in remote, unmanned locations for gas transportation along pipelines. It was first installed in a marine environment for the Åsgard subsea compression project where the technology development was focused on (what is termed) the ‘marinisation’ of the compressor and enabling equipment. When looking to develop a concept for later fields, as the core components were already proven, technology development was focused on what the differences were (Change Point Analysis) and Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) compared with Åsgard.
Technology development for the concepts was well documented and updated regularly, however, one of the biggest challenges through the years was the term ‘technology’. The challenge was in getting the decision makers (and even those further down the chain) to move beyond the term as it became a stumbling block in itself. Negative connotations of ‘technology’ (new, unproven, expensive) apparently began to throw up obstacles before ever reaching the point in the presentation. Decision-makers in the early days would recoil in shock and horror when the term appeared on slides and reports, and I’ve personally seen meetings called to a close with simple statements such as “we will never install subsea compression there”.
Progress in acceptance of subsea compression is only possible when concerns and risks are addressed. As above, where no meaningful, informed or substantiated reason was offered against it, the problem for advocates of subsea compression became the need to find arguments which would address all potential concerns. A lot of time was spent figuring out what these concerns could be, which led to some very creative discussions! Even at this time, there was a steadily growing mass of data and case studies which supported a selectable concept – albeit without the live operational data which decision-makers sought. Advocates considered this absence wasn’t a significant enough reason to discount the option, given the fundamental technology had already been proven in other applications, and operational data would be available by the time concept selection was due in the roadmap.
Fortunately, there were enough forward-thinkers to recognise the potential, and plans were initiated to develop programs to further capability or enable subsea compression. The programs engaged vendors and strategic partners, and generated JIPs to push technology along in the subsea space, but importantly provided access to the technology to inform the joint venture participants. A key fundamental requirement, though, was funding, the bulk of which was available at the Business Unit level, which was also the level at which most of the barriers presented. This was, therefore, a key focus: getting the decision makers to support the technology development would help to inform and gain acceptance for the technology. At least that was the plan.
However, there was still a barrier to utilising the technologies being developed in these programs – once again, it appeared the problem was fundamentally the word ‘technology’. The term was routinely rolled out as the reason subsea compression would not be installed in an actual operating environment. Although the decision makers were supporting the technology development programs, the support for installation in an operating environment was not there. This was an example of self-preservation rather than potentially doing what was best for the company (think high value). Decision makers were happy to support technology, provided it was only ever installed after they had moved on and it wasn’t their decision; ‘technology’ was still perceived as high risk, regardless of how much data was accumulating.
A positive outcome.
But it only came after subsea compression had been installed and operating for over a year. Confidence in the technology was growing and the unsubstantiated statement that “we will never install subsea compression there” became increasingly difficult to stand by. With virtually 100% availability of the subsea compression station on Åsgard, this exceeded the best an equivalent topsides compression platform could achieve.
Åsgard subsea compression has been operating at virtually 100% availability since start-up (almost three years now), with the compressors 100% available. Critically, the issues impacting the availability (pump and level transmitter) are understood and subject to Root Cause Analysis; future projects have taken these lessons learned into consideration in design.
Also of note is that Gullfaks has been operating at 100% availability and has exceeded 10,000 hours, qualifying the multiphase compressor at TRL 7. This has been operating in a mode outside the Gullfaks design brief, albeit within the capability of the machine (higher liquid loadings).
It all seems easy now, with hindsight. Subsea compression is fully qualified and selectable for projects, but if circumstances had not aligned at the right time, the technology work streams would have been closed down and the concept never would have been fully developed. Where we are today is testament to those who accepted the arguments with an open mind, who looked to a future full of opportunity and who filed the view that “it will never happen” away and followed due process and diligence to reach a wholly objective and inevitable conclusion – that the future is subsea.